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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XVIII DECEMBER, 1932 No. 1
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, SECTIONS 85-94,*
WITH MISSOURI ANNOTATIONSt
BY TYRRELL WILLIAMS
ToPic D. Informal Contracts Without Assent or Consideration
Section 85. ASSENT OR CONSIDERATION UNNECESSARY IN
CASES ENUMERATED IN SECTIONS 86-90.
Neither an expression of assent, unless the promise is in terms
conditional upon such an expression, nor consideration is requi-
site for the formation of an informal contract in the cases enu-
merated in Sections 86 to 90.
Comment:
a. The cases referred to in this Section are exceptions to the
general rule stated in Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 19. The
kequirements stated in Clauses (a) and (d) of that Section are
not affected. The limiting effect of Section 93 should also be
observed.
Annotation:
This Section is introductory. See separate annotations to Sec-
tions immediately following.
Section 19 presents the general rule as to the requirement of
manifest assent and the requirement of consideration in in-
formal contracts. Exceptions to this general rule are indicated
in Section 19 by the phrase "except as otherwise stated in Sec-
tions 85 to 94." This portion of the Restatement, Sections 85
* Copyright, 1928, The American Law Institute. The illustrations which
accompany the official text have been omitted.
t Copyright, 1931, by Washington University. Previous sections of the
Restatement, similarly annotated, will be found in the ST. Louis LAW RE-
viEw for December, 1930, February, 1931, June, 1931, and December, 1931.
Washington University Open Scholarship
2 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
to 94, treats of these exceptions. The American Law Institute
boldly announces that the Common Law recognizes as binding a
limited group of contracts in which there is neither seal nor con-
sideration, e. g., a debtor's promise to pay a debt in spite of a
discharge in bankruptcy. These promises are binding and there-
fore they are contracts, but they do not need any consideration
to make them binding. This is advance ground. It would be
easy to collect dicta from Missouri Reports that would be at
variance with this new doctrine of the Restatement. Neverthe-
less, there is no substantial conflict between the actual decisions
in Missouri and this portion of the Restatement. The same prac-
tical results are reached in deciding human controversies by the
Restatement's theory of no consideration, or by the several vary-
ing Missouri theories of constructive consideration, waiver or
estoppel. The differences between Missouri theories and the
new doctrine of the Restatement are verbal and speculative dif-
ferences, not practical and realistic differences.
Section 86. PROMISE TO PAY A DEBT Is BINDING THOUGH THE
DEBT IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
(1) Except as stated in Section 93, a promise to fulfill all or
part of an antecedent contractual or quasi-contractual duty for
the payment of money due from the promisor, other than a judg-
ment, is binding if the antedecent duty was once enforceable by
direct action, and is either still so enforceable or would be except
for the effect of a statute of limitations.
(2) The following facts operate as such a promise as that
stated in Subsection (1) unless other circumstances indicate a
different intention:
(a) A voluntary acknowledgment to the obligee, admitting
the present existence of such an antecedent duty as is
described in Subsection (1);
(b) A voluntary transfer of money, a negotiable instrument,
or other property to the obligee of such an antecedent
duty as is described in Subsection (1), if made as inter-
est thereon, or part payment thereof or collateral se-
curity therefor by the obligor, or by an agent of the
obligor whose authority so to act was not given irrev-
ocably before the antecedent duty was barred;
(c) A promise to the obligee of such an antecedent duty as
is described in Subsection (1) not to plead the Statute of
Limitations as a defense to an action thereon.
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(3) An executor, administrator, trustee or guardian who
makes such a promise as that stated in Subsection (1) cannot by
so doing impose a duty upon the estate which he represents. Nor
will he be personally bound unless he was bound by the ante-
cedent duty.
Comment:
a. The promises included under this Section, but not the part
payments or giving of negotiable instruments or collateral se-
curity, are required by statutes enacted in most States to be evi-
denced by a signed writing in order to be operative. In a few
States, however, no writing is required in any case. In a few
other States part payment or giving of security imposes no duty
on a debtor unless accompanied by and characterized by a
writing.
b. The antecedent duty must be for the payment of money but
it need not be for a liquidated sum and it may be under seal. An
antecedent duty under a judgment is not, however, included.
Annotation:
By R. S. Mo. 1929, See. 883, the acknowledgment or promise
to be evidence of the "new or continuing contraet' must be in
writing. This statute does not apply when the new promise is
supported by a new consideration. Bridges v. Stephens (1896)
132 Mo. 524, 34 S. W. 555. Such a case is outside the scope of
this Section 86 which applies only to gratuitous promises.
Shannon v. Austin (1878) 67 Mo. 485 and Carr's Adm. v.
Hurlbut (1867) 41 Mo. 264 give support to the theory that in
Missouri the action is upon the original contract and the new
promise operates as a waiver of the statutory defense. Davis v.
Herring (1839) 6 Mo. 21 and Petty v. Tucker (1912) 166 Mo.
App. 98, 148 S. W. 142 give support to the theory that the new
promise has a consideration, namely, the consideration of the
original contract. However, as a matter of substantive law, the
result would be the same if the new promise itself is a binding
contract without consideration.
Subsection (1). This is in general accord with Missouri de-
cisions.
The act of revivor may be made before the debt is barred.
Chidsey v. Powell (1887) 91 Mo. 622, 4 S. -W. 446. Or after the
bar has attached. Berryman v. Becker (1913) 173 Mo. App.
346, 158 S. W. 899. In Petty v. Tucker (1912) 166 Mo. App. 98,
148 S. W. 142 the duty was quasi-contractual, and an express
promise not in writing was ineffective merely because of R. S.
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Mo. 1929, Sec. 883. The exception as to judgments is probably
in accord with modern Missouri law. By virtue of an express
statutory provision, repealed in 1895, the principle was formerly
applied to judgments. Chiles v. School District (1903) 103 Mo.
App. 240, 77 S. W. 82.
Subsection (2a). This is in general accord with Missouri de-
cisions.
The promise may be implied from the acknowledgment. Chid-
sey ,v. Powell (1887) 91 Mo. 622, 4 S. W. 446. Acknowledgment
to a life insurance company may be sufficient when policy on
life of debtor is to protect creditor. Mastin v. Branham (1885)
86 Mo. 643. See also Thompson v. Richardson (Mo. 1917) 195
S. W. 1039, direct acknowledgment to creditor's executor. In-
structive cases where the alleged acknowledgments were insuffi-
cient are Chambers v. Rubey (1870) 47 Mo. 99, mere offer to
compromise; Cochrane v. Cott (1911) 156 Mo. App. 663, 138
S. W. 46, debt admitted but no intention to promise; Monroe v.
Herrington (1905) 110 Mo. App. 509, 85 S. W. 1002, language
equivocal.
Subsection (2b). In general accord with Missouri decisions.
"When a creditor holds several claims against his debtor, the
latter, on making a payment, has the right to direct upon which
debt it shall be credited; if he gives no direction, then the
creditor, on receiving the payment, can make the application;
if neither the debtor directs, nor the creditor applies, the pay-
ment, then the law will apply it to the debt which first matures,
unless justice and equity demand a different appropriation."
Beck v. Haas (1892) 111 Mo. 264, 20 S. W. 19. "It is the fact
of the partial payment of the note, and not the formal crediting
of such payment on the back of it, which revives the debt."
Miller v. Miller (1913) 169 Mo. App. 432, 155 S. W. 76. Evi-
dence of payment does not have to be in writing. Inhabitants of
Bridgeton v. Jones (1864) 34 Mo. 411. Ordinarily nothing but
money will satisfy a debt but a creditor and debtor may agree
on some other medium of payment. State ex rel. v. Allen (1908)
132 Mo. App. 98, 111 S. W. 622. In Earls v. Earls (Mo. App.
1916) 182 S. W. 1018, an alleged partial payment was insuffi-
cient as an acknowledgment for want of intention.
Subsection (2c). This is not inconsistent with Missouri de-
cisions.
No direct authority has been found for the proposition that
such a promise, without a new consideration, and not followed
by estoppel, is binding. In Bridges v. Stephens (1896) 132 Mo.
524, 34 S. W. 555, forbearance to sue was consideration for an
oral promise not to plead the Statute of Limitations. It was
held that such a promise is binding and the statute requiring a
writing does not apply when there is a new consideration or
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estoppel. An alleged promise not to plead the Statute of Limi-
tations was strictly construed in Monroe v. Herrington (1905)
110 Mo. App. 509, 85 S. W. 1002.
Subsection (3). When the new promise is without a new con-
sideration, this is not inconsistent with Missouri substantive
law.
Claims barred by the general Statute of Limitations cannot be
revived by promise of the executor. Bambrick v. Bambrick
(1900) 157 Mo. 423, 58 S. W. 8; Cape Girardeau County v..
Harbison (1874) 58 Mo. 90. On the other hand, it is not in-
cumbent upon an executor to plead the Statute of Limitations.
Overmeyerv. Rogers (1928) 222 Mo. App. 89, 1 S. W. (2d) 844.
But see Harrison Machine Works v. Aufderheide (1926) 222
Mo. App. 474, 280 S. W. 711. North v. Walker's Adm. (1877)
66 Mo. 453, was a case involving a new contract for a new con-
sideration by an administrator to extend time for payment of a
debt not barred. Executors and administrators may, with the
consent of the probate court, enter into binding compromises.
Scott v. Crider (1925) 217 Mo. App. 1, 272 S. W. 1010.
Section 87. PROMISE TO PAY A DEBT DISCHARGED IN BANK-
RUPTCY IS BINDING.
Except as stated in Section 93, a promise to pay all or part of
a debt of the promisor, discharged or dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy proceedings begun before the promise is made, is binding.
Comment:
a. In a few States only are the promises described in this
Section required to be in writing in order to be enforceable.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with results of Missouri decisions.
The Missouri cases proceed on the theory that the "moral
force" of the barred obligation is consideration for the new
promise. Wislizenus v. O'Fallon (1887) 91 Mo. 184, 3 S. W.
837; Boone County Milling & Elevator Co. v. Lowery (Mo. App.
1923) 248 S. W. 623; Ferguson-McKinney D. G. Co. v. Beuckman
(1917) 198 Mo. App. 41, 198 S. W. 504. This theory has some
support in Zarelo v. Reeves (1913) 227 U. S. 625, 57 L. Ed.
676. An allegation of valuable consideration for the new prom-
ise is sustained by proof of the old debt. Farmers & Merchants
Bank v. Richards (1906) 119 Mo. App. 18, 95 S. W. 290. Prom-
ise is binding when made before or after final discharge. Boone
County Milling & Elevator Co. v. Lowery (Mo. App. 1923) 248
S. W. 623. In Traders' Nat. Bank v. Hermer (Mo. App. 1920)
218 S. W. 937, the binding promise was made after adjudication
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and before discharge. In Fleming v. Lullman (1881) 11 Mo.
App. 104, it was held that the cause of action is upon the new
promise, and the Statute of Limitations runs against the new
promise. See also Bank of Rothville v. Zaleuke (1927) 221 Mo.
App. 1051, 295 S. W. 520.
In Missouri there is no statute requiring the new promise to be
in writing.
Section 88. PROMISE TO FULFILL A DUTY IN SPITE OF NON-
PERFORMANCE OF A CONDITION IS BINDING WHEN.
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2) and in Section 93, a
promise to fulfill all or part of an antecedent conditional duty in
spite of the non-fulfillment of the condition is binding, whether
the promise is made before or after the time for fulfilling the
condition, if performance of the condition is not a substantial
part of what was to have been given in exchange for the per-
formance of the antecedent duty, and if the uncertainty of the
happening of the condition was not a substantial element in in-
ducing the formation of the contract;
(2) If a promise such as stated in Subsection (1) is made be-
fore the time for fulfilling the condition has expired and the con-
dition is some performance by the promisee or other beneficiary
of the contract, the promisor can make his duty again subject'
to the condition by giving notice of his intention so to do before
there has been any substantial change of'position by the promi-
see or beneficiary and while there is still reasonable time to per-
form the condition.
Comment:
a. A promise may be conditional on receiving some per-
formance regarded as the equivalent of the performance in the
promise; as a promise to sell a horse if the promisee pays $500
for him. A promise may also be conditional on the happening
of some event, or the performance of some act which is little or
no part of the agreed exchange for the performance of the
promise, but fixes the time or manner in which the promise is
to be performed. In this last class of cases a promise to disre-
gard the condition is operative.
b. The new promise may be made either before the time for
the performance of the condition or after that time has elapsed.
If made before the time for the happening of the condition, the
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new promise naturally induces failure to perform the condition,
and if it does so the promisor cannot assert as an excuse a fail-
ure that he himself brought about (see Section 279). A new
promise subsequent to the time of the happening of the condi-
tion cannot have this effect. The failure of the condition dis-
charges the original duty, but the new promise subjects the
promisor to a new duty; as where an insurer promises to carry
out a policy in spite of default in some minor condition, or where
a guarantor, indorser, or other surety promises to be bound as
as such in spite of lack of a requisite notice or of the creditor's
failure to exercise diligence in presentment or in the prosecution
of his claim against the principal debtor or against the promisor
himself, or in spite of variation of the duty of the principal
debtor to the creditor.
c. It is immaterial how the promisor manifests his intention
to fulfill the prior duty without the performance of the condition
thereof. Whether he speaks of waiver or uses other words in
this connection is of no consequence, if the undertaking to per-
form is made plain.
Annotation:
This Section has to do with gratuitous promises to forego the
benefit of a minor condition in a contract. In Missouri such
promises, whether express or implied, are usually called waivers.
Sometimes a so-called waiver of a condition is supported by a
new consideration. See Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Baskett
(1903) 98 Mo. App. 53, 71 S. W. 1113, and Sanders' Press Brick
Co. v. Barr (1898) 76 Mo. App. 380. Promises supported by a
new consideration are entirely outside the scope of this Section.
A waiver under this Section is what was designated a "noncon-
tract waiver" in Patterson v. Amer. Ins. Co. (1912) 164 Mo.
App. 157, 148 S. W. 448.
Subsection (1). When the waiver is made at or after the time
for fulfilling the condition, the law of Missouri is in perfect ac-
cord with the Restatement.
In Schmidt v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. (1876) 2 Mo. App.
339, a life insurance case, there was a non-fulfilment of a con-
dition as to insured's place of residence. The Court said: "It re-
mains to be inquired what acts, if any, appearing in the testi-
mony, have amounted to such waiver of the condition in ques-
tion as may entitle the plaintiff to recover, notwithstanding its
breach. For this purpose any circumstances will be sufficient
which prove that the defendant, while Schmidt continued to re-
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side beyond the prescribed territorial boundaries, treats the con-
tract as subsisting nevertheless, and not forfeited. If the policy
had ceased to exist as a binding contract, the defendant had no
right to collect any more premiums. Its receipt of the premiums,
therefore, was a declaration to the other party that, so far as its
option was concerned-and that was conclusive in the prem-
ises-the contract was still in force." To the same effect:
Mackey ov. Home Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1926) 284 S. W. 161, a fire
insurance case with waiver of condition in iron safe clause; St.
Louis Police Relief Ass'n v. American Bonding Co. (1917) 197
Mo. App. 430, 196 S. W. 1148, waiver of condition as to signature
of bonded employee; St. Clair v. Hellweg (1913) 173 Mo. App.
660, 159 S. W. 17, waiver of condition as to time; Reed v. Bank-
ers' Union (1907) 121 Mo. App. 419, 99 S. W. 55, retention of
premiums paid after exact time of payment, held waiver of con-
dition as to health certificate in fraternal order's contract of life
insurance; Polk v. Western Assur. Co. (1905) 114 Mo. App. 514,
90 S. W. 397, waiver of condition as to additional insurance;
Fox v. Pullman Palace Car Co. (1884) 16 Mo. App. 122, waiver
by employer of condition in contract of employment.
In the following cases the principle of waiver of conditions in
a contract was recognized, but in each case it was held that the
facts did not constitute a waiver: Ehrlich v. The Aetna Life Ins.
Co. (1885) 88 Mo. 249, life insurance agency contract; Startzell
,v. Johnson (Mo. App. 1923) 253 S. W. 54, subcontract after
general building contract; Rice v. Plattsburg-Vib bard Coal Min-
ing Co. (Mo. App. 1921) 229 S. W. 298, contract to dig a mine.
The principle of this subdivision is recognized in the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, and the work "waiver" is used.
R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 2710, 2737, 2738, 2739. For typical cases
see: Orthwein v. Nolker (1921) 290 Mo. 284, 234 S. W. 787;
Belch v. Roberts (1915) 191 Mo. App. 243, 177 S. W. 1062;
Laumeier v. Hallock (1903) 103 Mo. App. 116, 77 S. W. 347.
When the promise to waive is made before the time for ful-
filling the minor condition, is it binding in the absence of a new
consideration and in the absence of any change of position by
the promisee? The Restatement answers this question in the
affirmative. R. S. Mo. 1929 Sec. 2737 in the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law expressly authorizes waiver of notice of dishonor
"before the time of giving notice has arrived," and is therefore
in accord with the Restatement. In Workingmen's Banking Co.
v. Blell (1894) 57 Mo. App. 410, a negotiable note case, there
was certainly a promise to disregard a condition after time of
performance and some evidence of an implied promise before
time of performance. Patterson v. Amer. Ins. Co. (1912) 164
Mo. App. 157, 148 S. W. 448, a fire insurance case, contains this
dictum, "there can be no waiver of forfeiture until the ground
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of forfeiture has occurred." This suggests a conflict with the
Restatement. However, the case is not in conflict if it be as-
sumed that the condition (non-vacancy of insured premises un-
less vacancy is by specific consent) was a "substantial part" of
the original consideration for the promisor's original duty.
For similarities and differences between estoppel and waiver
see Roberts v. American Nat. Assur. Co. (Mo. App. 1920) 220
S. W. 996 and Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Baskett (1903) 98 Mo.
App. 53, 71 S. W. 1113.
Subsection (2). The principle of this Subsection seems to be
in accord with Missouri law. In Wilt v. Hammond (1914) 179
Mo. App. 406, 165 S. W. 362, the Court said: "There is no doubt
that parties to a contract may waive for the time being a strict
compliance with some of its terms without binding themselves
to a continuance of such waiver, and while not allowed to take
advantage of the non-compliance already waived, or, perhaps, to
return to a strict enforcement without notice, yet, such parties
may on reasonable notice at least, either with or without valid
reasons therefor, demand a strict compliance with the terms of
the contract in the future."
Section 89. PROMISE TO PERFORM A VOIDABLE DUTY Is
BINDING.
Except as stated in Section 93, a promise to perform all or
part of an antecedent contract of the promisor, theretofore void-
able by him, but not avoided prior to the making of the promise,
is binding.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law.
For definition of a voidable contract see Section 13. In so far
as this Section relates to debts contracted during infancy it must
be applied in connection with R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 2971, which
proceeds on the theory of a power to ratify or avoid a voidable
contract. The ratification is effective without a new considera-
tion. For voidable contracts of infants, see Baker v. Kennett
(1873) 54 Mo. 82, effective avoidance; Lee v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. (1916) 195 Mo. App. 40, 189 S. W. 1195, binding
ratification; Koerner v. Wilkinson (1902) 96 Mo. App. 510, 70
S. W. 509, alleged ratification held not binding.
Other cases illustrating this Section are: Gwinn v. Simes
(1875) 61 Mo. 335, unilateral contract executed on Sunday in
violation of statute supports new promise made afterwards on
a secular day; Brown v. Worthington (1911) 152 Mo. App. 351,
133 S. W. 93, contract induced by duress is voidable; Harms ,v.
Wolf (1905) 114 Mo. App. 387, 89 S. W. 1037, contract induced
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by fraud is voidable. The common law contract of a married
woman is void, not voidable, and therefore outside the scope of
this Section. Musick v. Dodson (1882) 76 Mo. 624.
Section 90. PROMISE REASONABLY INDUCING DEFINITE AND
SUBSTANTIAL ACTION Is BINDING.
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to in-
duce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character
on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the promise.
Annotation:
This Section is broad enough to include as contracts certain
promises even if those promises are made without specific con-
tractual intent. The Section emphasizes the "objective test"
of contracts. See Section 20 and Missouri cases there noted.
This Section 90, when applied with Section 85, means that the
promise described is a contract without any consideration. In
Missouri the same practical result is reached without in theory
abandoning the doctrine of consideration. In Missouri three
theories have been advanced as ground for the decisions. (1)
Theory of act for promise. The induced "action or forbear-
ance" is the consideration for the promise. Underwood Type-
writer Co. v. Century Building Co. (1909) 220 Mo. 522, 119
S. W. 400. See Section 76. (2) Theory of promissory estop-
pel. The induced "action or forbearance" works an estoppel
against the promisor. In School District v. Sheidley (1897)
138 Mo. 672, 40 S. W. 656, a suit to collect on a promise to pay
money to a charitable trust, it was held that the promisor's
executors were "estopped to plead want of consideration" after
the promisee changed its position in reliance on the promise.
For other Missouri contract cases involving the substitution of
estoppel for consideration, see annotation under Section 45.
Additional estoppel cases are: Dodd v. St. L. & H. Railway Co.(1892) 108 Mo. 581, 18 S. W. 1117, a landowner who knowingly
permits defendant to expend money in the construction of a
railroad through his land without objection, sixteen years after-
wards is estopped from maintaining an ejectment suit; Dozier v.
Matson (1888) 94 Mo. 328, 7 S. W. 268, oral gift of land relied
upon by donee who then makes valuable improvements puts lat-
ter in "attitude of a purchaser"; Lawson v. Edwards (Mo. App.
1927) 293 S. W. 794, a "suggestion" by one party to a contract
that the other party act in a certain way followed by reliance
thereon, held a new contract modifying the preexisting contract.
Estoppel as used in the foregoing cases is a somewhat loose term.
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For a case giving the strict limitations of estoppel see Shields v.
McClure (1898) 75 Mo. App. 631. (3) Theory of bilateral con-
tract. When the induced "action or forbearance" is begun, a
promise to complete is implied, and we have an enforceable bi-
lateral contract, the implied promise to complete being the con-
sideration for the original promise. See Section 77. In Nichol-
son v. Acme Cement Plaster Co. (1909) 145 Mo.App.523,122 S.W.
773, there was a promise to pay cost of replastering a building
in which defendant's cement had been used. This promise was
relied upon and the work was done by plaintiff. In holding that
there was a contract, the Court criticized those "highly strained
technical rules in regard to the consideration of contracts,
whereby agreements which parties understood to be complete
and valid contracts are annulled." The Court added: "In this
matter, more than others, it is important to keep the law in ac-
cord with the understanding of the people; and it is our opinion
that hardly any man, except an astute lawyer, if placed as plain-
tiff was, would doubt he had a good contract." See also Ameri-
can Pub. & Engr. Co. v. Walker (1901) 87 Mo. App. 503.
This Section 90 is not at variance with the results of Missouri
decisions. There is a variance between the doctrine underlying
this Section and the theoretical justifications that have been ad-
vanced for the Missouri decisions.
Section 91. PROMISEs ENUMERATED IN SECTIONS 86-90 IF
CONDITIONAL ARE PERFORMABLE ONLY ON HAPPENING OF CON-
DITION.
If a promise within the terms of Sections 86, 87, 88, 89 and 90
is in terms conditional or performable at a future time the prom-
isor is bound thereby, but performance becomes due only upon
the happening of the condition or upon the arrival of the specified
time.
Annotation:
In so far as the conditional nature of the new promise is con-
cerned, this Section is in accord with Missouri law.
In Reith v. Luilman (1881) 11 Mo. App. 254, a suit on a new
promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy, the Court said:
"If there is a promise to pay depending upon a future con-
tingency, or coupled with a condition, it must be shown that
the contingency has happened, or that the condition has been
performed." See also Wislizenus v. O'Fallon (1887) 91 Mo. 184,
3 S. W. 837, new and absolute promise in writing cannot be
modified by parol evidence of condition. Farmers & Merchants
Bank v. Richards (1906) 119 Mo. App. 18, 95 S. W. 290 contains
a dictum that the new promise must be "unconditional" but the
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context and authorities cited show a conditional promise is "un-
conditional" when the condition is fulfilled.
Section 92. To WHOM PROMISES ENUMERATED IN SECTIONS
86-89 MUST BE MADE.
The new promise referred to in Sections 86, 87, 88 and 89 must
be made to the person to whom the money is then due, or to the
promisor's surety or co-principal or indemnitor.
Comment:
a. The word surety is used to include everyone who is bound
on an obligation, which as between himself and another person,
also bound to the obligee for the same performance, the latter
obligor should discharge. Thus an indorser or a guarantor is a
kind of surety.
b. The promisee may be the original obligee or an assignee;
and after the new promise is made, as well as before, the right
of the promisee will be negotiable or assignable, depending on
the character of the original duty and of the renewal promise.
Annotation:
If it be understood that the word "person" includes creditor
and the creditor's known agent, then this Section seems to be in
accord with Missouri decisions.
,In the following cases the new promise was held to be binding:
Thompson v. Richardson (Mo. 1917) 195 S. W. 1039, acknowl-
edgment to creditor's executor; Mastin v. Branham (1885) 86
Mo. 643, promise to insurer of debtor's life for protection of
creditor; Reith v. Lullman (1881) 11 Mo. App. 254, creditor's
collector held to be agent for purpose of communicating the
promise.
In the following cases the new promise was held to be insuffi-
cient: Allen v. Collier (1879) 70 Mo. 138, undelivered written
promise by debtor; Williamson v. Williamson (1892) 50 Mo.
App. 194, alleged agent held to be a stranger and holding based
upon Fort Scott v. Hickman (1884) 112 U. S. 150, 28 L. Ed. 636.
Comment b. is illustrated by Wislizenus v. O'Fallon (1887) 91
Mo. 184, 3 S. W. 837, plaintiff being assignee of promisee.
Section 93. PROMISES ENUMERATED IN SECTIONS 86-89 NOT
BINDING IF MADE IN IGNORANCE OF FACTS.
A promise within the terms of Sections 86, 87, 88 or 89 is not
binding unless the promisor knew or had reason to know the es-
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sential facts of the previous transaction to which the promise
relates, but his knowledge of the legal effect of the facts is im-
material.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law.
The following cases relate to knowledge of facts: Brown v.
South Joplin Lead & Zinc Mining Co. (1910) 231 Mo. 166, 132
S. W. 693, new binding promise after knowledge of fraud justi-
fying rescision of prior contract; Baker v. Kennett (1873) 54
Mo. 82, infancy contract case-"promise must be made with a
knowledge of the facts"; Miller v. Miller (1913) 169 Mo. App.
432, 155 S. W. 76, debt barred by Statute of Limitations ef-
fectively renewed because of full knowledge of facts. Pertinent
to the last clause of Section 93 is Ring v. Jamison (1877) 66 Mo.
424, infancy contract case-ignorance of law held immaterial.
Section 94. STIPULATIONS.
Agreements with reference to a proceeding pending in court,
made by attorneys representing adverse parties to the proceed-
ing, are not deprived of legal operation because of lack of con-
sideration, nor, if made in the presence of the Court, because
made orally. If not made in the presence of the Court, a writ-
ing is generally required by statute or rule of court.
Comment:
Such agreements as are within the rule stated in this Section
are called stipulations. In some States if a stipulation is not
made in the presence of the Court, other formalities than a writ-
ing, such as filing in court, are requisite for its validity.
Annotation:
R. S. Mo. 1929 Sections 906, 935, 936 relate to stipulations as
defined by this Section of the Restatement. In so far as R. S.
Mo. 1929 Sec. 935 compels a court to recognize as stipulation
for a continuance, some doubt has been expressed as to its con-
stitutionality. 15 ST. Louis L. REV. 189. Many, if not all, cir-
cuit courts in Missouri have rules requiring all stipulations to be
in writing unless made in open court.
A stipulation is a "contract," and when it relates to assessing
non-statutory costs of litigation and is breached, the remedy is a
motion to retax costs. In re McManus' Estate (Mo. App. 1917)
199 S. W. 422. Stipulations are construed like other contracts,
so as to bring out the manifest intention of the parties. Hanchett
Bond Co. v. Glore (1921) 208 Mo. App. 169, 232 S. W. 159.
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This Section 94 is not inconsistent with Missouri decisions,
but no case has been found expressly holding that a stipulation is
operative without a consideration. Many stipulations are in
the nature of agreements to compromise pending litigation, and
as such have been justified by the presence of consideration.
See Brandenburger v. Puller (1916) 266 Mo. 534, 181 S. W.
1141; North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Stephens (1865) 36 Mo. 150;
Lewis v. Wilson (1894) 151 U. S. 551, 38 L. Ed. 267.
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